RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM IN THE USA
When Roger Williams, the
founder of the state of Rhode Island, included a guarantee of religious
liberty in the Constitution of that state, it became the first state
ever to do so. This led to the first Sabbath-keeper migrating to the
United States. In 1664, Stephen Mumford arrived in Rhode Island. He had
fled his native England fearing the same fate as John James who three
years earlier, in 1661, had refused to cease preaching on the Sabbath
day, at the command of the sheriffs of King Charles II. He was convicted
of high treason and hanged, drawn, and quartered. Mumford spread his
convictions and eventually the Seventh Day Baptist church was
established in America.
Roger Williams had
himself been banished from Massachusetts in 1631 because he had declared
his opinion that the magistrate might not punish a breach of the Sabbath
(Sunday) Winthrop's Journal, Vol. 1, pp. 52,53, cited in American State
Papers, Third Edition, p. 57, Review and Herald Publishing Association,
1943.
Despite the fact that a
large number of immigrants arriving in the United States during its
founding days were escaping religious persecution themselves, they
afforded little religious liberty to those who were of minority faiths
within their own borders. Many of the original states breached the
religious liberties of citizens who desired only to worship God as their
consciences dictated. The Congregational Church in Massachusetts, the
Methodists in Kansas, and the Church of England (Episcopalian) in
Virginia had particularly poor records of religious liberty in the early
days, and even the early Quaker settlers in Pennsylvania were not
convinced of the concept of religious liberty in their colony.
The inclusion of the
guarantee of religious liberty and the separation of church and state
into the First Amendment of the United States Constitution was a great
step forward in the provision of religious liberty for the citizens of
the United States. Yet over and over again it failed to prevent the
states from enacting and enforcing Sunday laws in the nineteenth
century. The record of the United States in that century was poor. Many
virtuous persons were jailed, even placed in chain gangs or ruined
financially, simply
because they failed to desist from work on Sunday.
In the 1880's, Senator
Blair of New Hampshire promoted Sunday legislation in the U.S. Senate
with great vigor, but without success. However, it was in the nineteenth
century that the ground was laid by the judiciary of the United States
to open the way for widespread Sunday laws, despite the protection of
religious liberty afforded under the First Amendment. Indeed, the
ingenuity of the proponents of Sunday legislation in the judiciary knew
no bounds in their desire to enforce such laws by circumventing the
First Amendment. This should be a lesson to all Americans today.
Many believe that before
Sunday laws are once more placed in force, that it would be necessary to
undertake the very difficult process of repealing the First Amendment.
But the history of the nineteenth century stands as a testimony that,
with no little guile, the justices of various courts, were able to
distort fact and claim that Sunday laws were not religious in nature.
Such claims may convince the unthinking, but in reality are simply
self-serving subterfuges to circumvent the clear intent of the First
Amendment.
Chief Justice Stephen
Field of the California Supreme Court, had, in 1858, prior to his
elevation to the highest judicial post in the state, introduced a sham
reasoning to ease the way for decisions in favor of Sunday legislation.
As attorney Warren Johns states, Field, aware that Sunday laws rested on
shaky ground if justification was tied to religious purposes... offered
constitutional refuge to blue laws [Sunday laws] by treating them as
civil rather than religious legislation (Warren Johns, Dateline Sunday,
Pacific Press, 1963, pp. 84,85).
Since Field was later
elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States, his legal ploy was
carried into that court. Field asserted that health and welfare benefits
would result from a weekly rest day. This form of promotion has now
surfaced in countries such as Australia, the Netherlands, and Norway. In
Nebraska, the move for a
Sunday law was rooted on the grounds that it made the state "family
friendly" (Lincoln Sunday Journal Star, March 1, 1998). Further as
we have seen, the Pope's Apostolic Letter, Dies Domini, has advocated
Sunday civil legislation on the grounds of its benefits for servants and
workers.
But a serious student of
these moves to Sunday legislation will not be deceived. They are
religious, strictly religious. The fact that the moves arise from Roman
Catholic and Protestant sources should deceive no one. Make no mistake,
the chief victims of Sunday law enforcement have always been religious
minorities. It must not escape the notice of the wise that although
civil penalties have been invoked for breaches of Sunday laws, no such
penalties have been enacted for failure to rest on civil rest days such
as national holidays.
When was anyone
prosecuted for failure to rest on the fourth of July or Martin Luther
King day? If a government believes that at least one day of rest is
essential per
week for all citizens, what purpose can there be in confining that day
to Sunday? Surely the citizen should be afforded the privilege of
choosing such a day at his convenience. Does a rest on Sunday ensure
better health than a rest on Monday? The answer is that all Sunday laws
proscribing labor are religious and in the United States do breach the
First Amendment of the American Constitution.
Even as recently as
1932, A deputy sheriff [in Virginia] arrested two Seventh-day Adventists
for Sunday work, one a crippled mother who walked on crutches
for
washing clothes on her own premises, and the other, a man who donated
and hauled a load of wood to church to heat it for religious services
(American State Papers, op. cit., p. 567).
In 1926 a spy saw a man
pressing his trousers on Sunday in Baltimore,
Maryland. He was fined. In Georgia in 1930, police arrested a Bible
colporteur for delivering a book of Bible exposition on Sunday, yet
assisted a circus to set up and permitted an airplane to give joy rides
on the very same day (Warren Johns, op. cit., p. 114). We need not be
deceived. Sunday laws are aimed primarily against religious
dissenters. Numerous other such cases are extant and have been
documented in Warren Johns' masterly book.
The history of the
enacting of religious laws by governments, the union of church and
state, is a very explosive one. Inevitably, such legislation leads to
deprivation of religious liberty and persecution of minorities.
Governments possess one right and one right alone in religious matters
the protection of the religious liberty of all their citizens.
Happy is the nation where the government confines its religious
legislation to that single prerogative.
Rightly, in 1959, the
Federal Court found that the Massachusetts Sunday laws were religious.
But in 1962, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled by an 8-1
majority that Sunday laws did not breach the First Amendment. This was
an incredible decision and a most dangerous one. This decision has not
been revoked or overturned.
It stands ready for and favorable to the enactment of Sunday laws. The
First Amendment has proved to be little protection, in these last days,
against the promotion of the sectarian convictions of the majority and
the revoking of religious liberty of all. The United States stands
well-positioned to assist the first beast power in enforcing Sunday
observance.
In presenting the
majority decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren claimed that
-to
say that states cannot prescribe Sunday as a day of rest for these
[secular] purposes solely because centuries ago such laws had their
genesis in religion would give a Constitutional interpretation of
hostility to the public welfare rather than one of mere separation of
church and state.
He went on to write, It
is common knowledge that the first day of the week has come to have
special significance as a day of rest in this country. People of all
religions and people of no religion regard Sunday as a time for family
activity, for visiting friends and relatives, for late sleeping, for
passive and active entertainment, for dining out and
the like.... Sunday is a day apart from all others. The cause is
irrelevant; the fact exists. It would seem unrealistic to require a
state to choose a common day of rest other than that most persons would
select of their own accord (Case McGowan v. Maryland).
Despite the assertion of
this eminent jurist, the cause is most decidedly not irrelevant. The
cause denotes a sorry history of religious persecution. In any case,
what business is it of a state to enforce any day as a day of rest for
all citizens?
Justice Felix
Frankfurter also wrote an opinion in this case, in support of the
majority decision. He implausibly acknowledged that -the
earlier among the colonial statutes were unquestionably religious in
purpose.... But even the seventeenth century legislation does not show
an exclusive religious preoccupation.
Only Justice William
Douglas dissented in the four Sunday law cases adjudged in 1961
(Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermarket; McGowan v. Maryland; Two Guys
from Harrison v. McGinley; Brownfeld v. Brown). Justice Douglas
asserted, quite properly, in his dissenting opinion that Sunday laws did
in fact breach both the establishment clause
(that is, the prohibition of the State establishing a religion) and the
free exercise clause (the right of all citizens to exercise their faith
freely) as enshrined in the First Amendment. He well stated that-
The First Amendment
commands government to have no interest in theology or ritual; it
admonishes government to be interested in allowing religious freedom to
flourish whether the result is to produce Catholics, Jews or
Protestants, or to turn the people toward the path of Buddha, or to end
in a predominately Moslem nation, or to produce in the long run atheists
or agnostics!
In citing the protection
of the religious liberty of all citizens, Justice Douglas expressed a
dictum of great wisdom.
But Justice Douglas'
opinion, expressed so cogently and with great wisdom, did not prevail.
Americans remain under the judicial imposition that Sunday laws do not
breach the First Amendment, despite the fact that they clearly do.
In recent years two
other major decisions of the Supreme Court have further positioned the
United States to fulfill the actions of the second beast of Revelation,
while God does not predestinate, He does foresee the future with equal
clarity as He does the past and present.
On April 17, 1990 in the
case of Smith v. the State of Oregon, the Supreme Court by a 5-4
majority effectively removed the religious liberty of every citizen. The
case itself is not so much of interest. It concerned American Indians
who treated fellow American Indians for various ailments including drug
abuse. They were employed by the State of Oregon. It was discovered that
these health workers were themselves taking a drug, peyote, in pagan
religious rites to which they adhered. Consequently the state fired
them. They ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that their
First Amendment rights had been breached.
They lost the case. What
did concern those who value religious liberty was that in his majority
opinion Justice Antonin Scalia went far beyond the case and declared
that
when religious rights clash with the government's need for uniform
rules, the court will side with the government (Los Angeles Times, April
18, 1990).
In commenting the
newspaper stated, the Supreme Court Tuesday forcefully declared that it
would no longer shield believers whose practices violate general laws
(Ibid.).
Following the Civil War,
the Fourteenth Amendment had been added to
the United States Constitution. It stated in part, that No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The Amendment, as time
passed, was interpreted to protect citizens from state legislation which
was in conflict with the United States Constitution. By 1925 the United
States Supreme Court had decreed that First Amendment guarantees were
applicable to state and local government through the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Warren Johns, op. cit., p. 113).
Such support of the
First Amendment by the Fourteenth Amendment led the Supreme Court, in
the 1940's, to uphold the right of Jehovah's Witnesses refusing to
salute the flag. In 1986 the Supreme Court told the states that they
could not deny unemployment benefits to Seventh-day Adventists who
refused to work on Saturdays (Los Angeles Times, April 18, 1990).
In 1972, the U.S.
Supreme Court exempted Amish children from compulsory school laws.
But subsequently, the
1990 Smith decision was antagonistic to all such decisions. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, presenting the dissenting opinion of the four
Supreme Court justices who objected to Justice Scalia's opinion, (even
though she herself was one of the six justices who denied the Smith
claim for reinstatement), stated that Justice Scalia's opinion is
incompatible with our nation's commitment to individual religious
liberty. In my view, the First Amendment was enacted precisely to
protect the rights of those whose religious practices are not shared by
the majority and may be viewed with hostility (Los Angeles Times, April
18, 1990).
In this opinion, Justice
O'Connor was absolutely correct. The majority decision was an affront to
religious liberty in the United States.
President Bill Clinton
attempted to redress the issue through legislating a bill to restore
religious liberty and although it passed Congress, it was struck down by
the Supreme Court.
Did the Smith v. the
State of Oregon decision have practical implications in respect of the
deprivation of religious liberty of American citizens? Most definitely
it did. Those effects were rapid. Only just over ten months later, the
Washington Post, March 9, 1991, listed numbers of cases where citizens
were deprived of their religious liberty by the court's majority opinion
in the Smith case.
The most glaring example
is that of the Yang case. The Yang family had migrated to the United
States from Laos. They were Buddhists. Tragically their 23-year-old son
died of natural causes. The physician requested an autopsy, but the
parents refused permission since the Buddhist faith opposes such
procedures. Ignoring the
parents' prohibition, the physicians performed the post-mortem. The
Yangs sought compensation on the grounds that "the forced autopsy
infringed on their religious freedom" (Ibid.). In January, 1990,
U.S.
District Judge Raymond
J. Pettine upheld their claim. We observe that this decision was
delivered three months prior to the Smith decision of the Supreme Court.
No decision was made at that time in respect of damages. Ten months
later, when Pettine was deciding how much money the family should be
awarded, the judge announced "with deep regret" and "the
deepest sympathy for the Yangs" that the Smith decision had forced
him to reverse his ruling" (Ibid.).
The Yangs clearly had
been deprived of their religious liberty by the Smith decision. Their
claim had been upheld three months before that decision and negated
seven months after the decision. Ironically this decision was taken in
the state of Rhode Island, where Roger Williams had been the
seventeenth-century trailblazer in guaranteeing religious liberty to its
citizens.
A Jewish woman in
Michigan lost a similar case under the Smith decision when an autopsy
was performed on her son. The Jewish faith forbids autopsies. A Moslem
prison inmate in Illinois lost his petition to be served a diet devoid
of pork on the same grounds (Ibid.). Numbers of other cases were listed.
The Smith decision did override the First Amendment protections and thus
made it almost ineffectual. The United States has virtually reached the
stage of the incredible decision of the Supreme Court of the State of
New Jersey which found, in the case, State of New Jersey v. Perricones
(1962), that "the freedom of religion guaranteed in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution was the freedom of belief,
not the freedom of practice, and religious practices could be controlled
by the state" (Montie Barringer, Insight, August 2, 1977). To
provide the right of belief but not of practice is to provide only that
liberty which cannot be taken from the individual, for it is a matter of
the mind.
Referring to the Smith
case, Forest Montgomery, counsel for the National Association of
Evangelicals stated that the problem with the [Smith] decision is that
the United States Supreme Court has gutted the free exercise of the
First Amendment (Washington Post, March 9, 1991).
Thus the Supreme Court
has now put in place a decision which would permit the government, if it
felt a compelling reason to do so, to trample the consciences of
sabbathkeepers.
Further, on March 26,
1991, the Supreme Court removed the protection afforded under the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The case concerned the death penalty
imposed upon Oreste Fulminante by an Arizona court. Fulminante had
confessed murder of his 11-year-old stepdaughter to a fellow inmate
working as a government informant (Washington Post, March 27, 1991).
He appealed to the
Supreme Court on the grounds that his confession was coerced. By a 5-4
majority, the Supreme Court held that Fulminante's confession had been
coerced and his appeal was upheld. One would have thought that the
result would simply have been that the trial verdict would be quashed
and a new trial would be called at which the confession would have been
inadmissable. However, the justices once more went far beyond the case
itself and voted that some convictions may be allowed to stand despite
the case of confessions obtained in violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights (Ibid., emphasis supplied).
The Fifth Amendment
guarantees that no coerced confession is admissible evidence of guilt in
a trial. This has been interpreted to include psychological coercion as
well as physical torture. In writing the majority opinion, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist spoke of "harmless error" in admitting such
evidence before a court. It is difficult to describe the use of a
coerced confession as harmless. One of the justices, Anthony Kennedy,
credibly stated that other than a videotape of the crime one would have
difficulty in finding evidence more damaging to a criminal plea of
innocence than a
confession (Ibid.).
It seems unconscionable
that Supreme Court justices boldly state that "the use of
confessions in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights"
is sometimes acceptable in a criminal case. Decisions such as this place
the judiciary above the Constitution, to
which they should be subject.
It is little wonder that Justice Byron White, writing for the dissenting
justices stated that, Permitting a coerced confession which could be
part of the evidence on which a jury is free to bare its verdict of
guilty is incompatible with the thesis that ours is not an inquisitional
system of criminal justice (Ibid., emphasis added).
White's use of the word
"inquisitional" was perfectly justifiable for surely all use
of coercion in order to extract a confession harks back to the days of
the inquisition.
The Jewish system of
justice two thousand years ago accepted no confession of guilt as
evidence in criminal trials. This judicial rule applied whether the
accused was subject to coercion or freely made such a confession. This
was a wonderful protection for often it is difficult to prove a
confession to be coerced. While at Christ's trial Caiaphas in
desperation used Christ's confession that He was the Son of God in order
to convict Him of blasphemy, he did so in breach of the Jewish law.
But Jesus held his
peace. And the high priest answered and said unto him, I adjure thee by
the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of
God. Jesus saith unto him, Thou hast said: nevertheless I say unto you,
Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of
power, and coming in the clouds of
heaven. Then the high priest rent his clothes, saying, He hath spoken
blasphemy; what further need have we of witnesses? Behold, now ye
have heard his blasphemy (Matthew 26:63-65).
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